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AN ECLECTIC APPROACH TO
IMPEACHMENT BY PRIOR CONVICTIONS
Almost every state permits persons convicted of a crime to
testify in either their own or another person's behalf.1 Nonethe-
less, these states allow evidence of a person's prior criminal
conviction to be used to impeach his credibility. 2 The use of this
method of impeachment in criminal trials has been the subject of
substantial adverse criticism;3 yet, the practice remains wide-
spread. 4 This article first will discuss the problems that arise from
the use of prior conviction evidence for impeachment purposes in
criminal trials and then will examine several proposals that would
restrict the use of such evidence. Finally, the article will propose
an alternative rule to regulate the use of prior conviction evi-
dence.
I. THE ANOMALOUS USE OF PRIOR CONVICTION
EVIDENCE FOR IMPEACHMENT PURPOSES
The impeachment capacity of prior conviction evidence rests
upon the assumption that a person who has been willing to con-
'C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE §43, at 89 (1954) [hereinafter cited as
MCCORMICK]. Some states bar persons who have been convicted of certain types of
crimes from testifying. Pennsylvania, for example, disqualifies persons convicted of per-
jury or subornation of perjury. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 315 (1963). See also ALA. CODE
tit. 7, §§ 434-435 (1960).
2 The Michigan statute, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2158 (1968), is typical:
No person shall be excluded from giving evidence on any matter, civil or
criminal, by reason of crime or for any interest of such person in the matter,
suit, or proceeding in question, or in the event of such matter, suit or
proceeding, in which such testimony may be offered, or by reason of marital
or other relationship to any party thereto; but such interest, relationship, or
conviction of crime may be shown for the purpose of drawing in question the
credibility of such witness, except as is hereinafter provided.
See also COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 154-1-1 (1963); Mo. REV. STAT. § 491.050 (1969);
N.Y. CIV. PRAC. § 4513 (McKinney 1963).
3 E.g., Ladd, Credibility Tests-Current Trends. 89 U. PA. L. REV. 166 (1940);
Spector, Impeachment Through Past Convictions: A Time for Reform, 18 DEPAUL L.
REV. 1 (1968); Note, Procedural Protections of the Criminal Defendant -A Reevaluation
of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination and the Rule Excluding Evidence of Propensity
to Commit Crime, 78 HARV. L. REV. 426 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Procedural Protec-
tions]; Note, Impeaching the Accused by his Prior Crimes-A New Approach to an Old
Problem, 19 HAST. L. REV. 919 (1968) [hereinafter cited as A New Approach]; Note,
Other Crimes Evidence at Trial: Of Balancing and Other Matters, 70 YALE L.J. 763
(1961).
4 Even where impeachment with prior convictions is not expressly authorized by statute,
it is recognized by judicial decision. See, e.g., State v. Foggy, 101 Ariz. 459, 463, 420 P.2d
934, 938 (1967).
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travene societal norms imposed by law will be willing to con-
travene those norms on the witness stand. Put in more practical
terms, the jury is asked to infer that the witness with a criminal
record possesses a generally evil character, that persons of such
character are likely to lie under oath, and, finally, that the witness
has in fact lied. 5
These inferences, however, are merely conclusions about con-
duct based on the alleged character of a witness. In this respect,
the use of prior conviction evidence for impeachment purposes
contradicts the well-established rule that where character is not an
ultimate issue in the case,6 evidence of character will not be
admissible to prove conduct. 7 The widely accepted rationale for
this exclusionary rule is that the dangers of prejudice, distraction
from material issues, time consumption, and surprise outweigh the
probative value of the evidence. 8
Concern over some of these same factors militates against the
use of prior convictions to impeach credibility. Although the
factors of surprise and time consumption do not justify the ex-
clusion of impeachment evidence,9 there is a substantial possi-
bility that this evidence will shift the jury's attention from the
material issue of the guilt of the defendant to the collateral issues
of the character of a witness. The major concern, however, is not
that distraction will confuse the jury, but that the jury will give
5 Justice Holmes formulated this rationale in Gertz v. Fitchburg R.R., 137 Mass. 77, 78
(1884), an appeal of a personal injury case in which the plaintiff had been impeached with
evidence of a prior conviction of impersonating a United States revenue officer. See Ladd,
supra note 3, at 175-76.
6 Substantive law may make a party's character the crucial issue in the case. Thus, in a
slander case a defendant's allegedly slanderous charges of plaintiffs bad character may be
proved in pursuit of a defense of truth. See, e.g., Talmadge v. Baker. 22 Wis. 625 (1868)
(evidence of prior theft improperly excluded where alleged defamation was that plaintiff
had a habit of taking things).7 Phinney v. Detroit United Ry., 232 Mich. 399, 405, 205 N.W. 124, 126 (1925); Rich
v. Cooper, 234 Or. 300, 308, 380 P.2d 613, 615 (1963) (dictum); Sims v. Sole, 238 Or.
329, 336-37, 395 P.2d 133, 136 (1964) (dictum). The conduct sought to be proved with
impeachment evidence is that the witness is lying on the stand. The rule is generally
applied to the use of character evidence to prove the conduct subject to the current
proceeding. For example, it would be error to admit evidence of a defendant's carefulness
in a negligence action. Harriman v. Pullman Palace-Car Co., 85 F. 353, 354 (8th Cir.
1898).
s See Love v. Wolf, 226 Cal. App. 2d 378, 388, 38 Cal. Rptr. 183, 188 (1964) (evidence
of defendant's wealth too prejudicial); Lombardi v. Simko, 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 363, 367-69,
214 A.2d 911, 915-16 (1965) (evidence of plaintiffs previous negligence suits collateral,
speculative and too confusing); Baker Pool Co. v. Bennett, 411 S.W.2d 335 (Ky. Ct. App.
1965) (collateral and prejudicial); Matta V. Welcher, 387 S.W.2d 265, 269 (Mo. Ct. App.
1965) (evidence of road conditions and speed limits in vicinity of accident was collateral
and conjectural).
9 Counsel will generally be aware of the backgrounds of his witnesses and will thus be
unable to claim surprise upon the introduction of past crimes. Time consumption is also
negligible, for proof of a prior conviction can be quickly achieved by official record.
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impeachment evidence too much weight. 10 This is the problem of
prejudice which is discussed below.
II. THE DANGERS OF IMPEACHMENT WITH
PRIOR CONVICTION EVIDENCE
A. Relevance and Probative Value
Evidence of a person's prior criminal convictions may not be
relevant to his credibility on the witness stand. Despite their
relevance to general character, few criminal acts indicate a speci-
fic propensity to lie." Nevertheless, most states permit the prose-
cution to introduce evidence of felonies and varying classes of
misdemeanors for impeachment purposes. 12 Convictions for
crimes like murder, assault or robbery may indicate that the
offender has a tendency toward violence, but they do not indicate
that he will lie under oath. Even prior convictions for fraud or
perjury indicate only that the witness has found sufficient justifica-
tion to lie in the past; they do not indicate present motivation. If it
strains reason to infer a tendency toward falsity from several
prior convictions, certainly it does so to infer this from a single
offense.' 3 This reasoning supports, in part, the law's requirement
that when character is at issue it must be proved by general
reputation in the community rather than by opinion evidence or
evidence of specific misconduct.' 4
When the additional means of impeaching credibility are exam-
ined, the necessity for using prior conviction evidence becomes
even more questionable. For example, the demeanor of the wit-
ness may in some instances serve as a reliable indicator of his
honesty. 15 The prosecutor may always cross-examine the witness
concerning weaknesses of his testimony in an attempt to induce
10 Distraction and time consumption take on more importance when the prosecution
seeks to introduce the details of the prior misconduct. The trial court is likely to disallow
such digressions. See note 38 and accompanying text infra.
11 See Ladd, supra note 3, at 180, where the author attempts a brief catalogue of crimes
relevant and irrelevant to credibility. See also Ladd, Techniques of Character Testimony,
24 IOWA L. REV. 498, 532- 34; Spector, supra note 3, at 4; Procedural Protections at 44 1;
A New Approach at 919- 20.
12MCCoRMICK §43, at 90-91. The Michigan statute permits the introduction into
evidence of any conviction. See note 2 supra.
13 See Ladd, supra note 3, at 176-80. The author notes that a conviction may, never-
theless, be indicative of a course of conduct; for example, the accused may have com-
mitted crimes that were never discovered and thus for which he was never convicted. Id.
at 178.14 1d. at 177.
15 In some instances, of course, demeanor may be misleading: a nervous or frightened
witness may appear to be lying when actually telling the truth; a confident witness with a
forceful personality may appear honest when in fact he is lying.
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him to contradict statements that he made on direct examination.
Similarly, the differing testimony of others may be introduced to
contradict statements made by the witness. If the witness's story
changes at trial, his prior inconsistent statements may be used to
discredit him. By testing the witness's memory, vision, or ability
to estimate time, the prosecution may cast doubt on the accuracy
of his statement.' In short, excluding evidence of prior con-
victions for impeachment purposes would not leave the prose-
cution without other recognized means to challenge the credibility
of a witness.
In any event, when the defendant testifies in his own behalf, the
jury is generally aware of the time he has had to prepare a story as
well as his interest in preserving his freedom. 17 The weight given
to his testimony is therefore likely to be reduced. In this instance,
for the jury to know that the defendant has been convicted of
prior crimes adds little to its knowledge that the accused has a
motive to lie.
B. Direct and Indirect Prejudice
A danger of direct prejudice arises when the prosecution in-
troduces a defendant's prior criminal record. The jury may con-
clude not only that the defendant is a man of vicious character but
also that he is more likely to be guilty of the crime with which he
is charged.' 8 Moreover, a jury may punish a defendant with prior
convictions not because of his guilt but because it thinks society
needs protection from a man of such character.' 9 A University of
Chicago study illustrates the point. The study shows that when
the prosecutor's evidence is of "normal strength," 20 the con-
viction rate is 27 percent higher for defendants with a prior
criminal record than it is for those without.2 1 These dangers have
long been deemed sufficient to establish the rule that the prose-
cutor may not initially introduce evidence of a defendant's bad
character, through prior conviction or otherwise, unless he em-
ploys such evidence to prove something other than defendant's
16 MCCORMICK § 33, at 62; Procedural Protections at 441.
17 Procedural Protections at 440, 450.
18 1 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 57, at 456, § 194, at 650 (3d ed. 1940); MCCORMICK § 43,
at 93; Ladd, supra note 3, at 187; Spector, supra note 3, at 4.
19 Id.
20 H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 160 (1966). The prosecutor's evi-
dence is of normal strength when there is no confession and no eye-witnesses have
testified.
21 Id.
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guilt.22 Nevertheless, the prosecution may introduce the defend-
ant's criminal record under the guise of impeachment, for the
purpose then is to show a lack of credibility. Thus the prosecution
may cross-examine the defendant as to his prior crimes if he takes
the stand. Also, character witnesses for the accused may be
cross-examined concerning their awareness 23  of his prior
crimes. 24 In some jurisdictions the prosecution is given even
greater leeway. Once the accused puts his credibility in issue, a
prosecutor may prove his criminal record in rebuttal rather than
by cross-examination. 25
The state may also impeach a third party witness on
cross-examination by questioning him about his own criminal
record. When witnesses are brought in by a defendant, the dan-
gers of undue prejudice to the defendant reappear. The initial
danger is that a third party witness will simply be disbelieved
because of his criminal record. However, a more important dan-
ger may result from a jury associating an accused with his im-
peached witness. If discredit of a witness spreads to the defen-
dant, this indirect prejudice will unjustifiably harm his case. 26
C. Consequences of the Fear of Prejudice
Whether prejudice be direct or indirect, its consequences can
be severe. The fear of direct prejudice is likely to convince a
defendant not to call witnesses to testify to his good character,
since the prosecution would then be able to cross-examine them
22 See Lovely v. United States 189 F.2d 386, 388-89 (4th Cir. 1948). The case most
often cited discussing this principle and its ex6eptions is People v. Molineux, 168 N.Y.
264, 291-94, 61 N.E. 286, 293-94 (1901). A compilation of some of the valid
non-impeachment uses of prior convictions evidence may be found in MCCORMICK § 157,
at 327 -31. The rule itself is actually a corollary to the rule that excludes evidence of
character to prove conduct. See text accompanying note 7 supra.
23It has been held improper to ask a witness testifying to a defendant's good character if
he knows of the defendant's previous convictions. However, a character witness may be
asked if he has heard of such prior misconduct. This is because the character witness is
testifying to the defendant's reputation in the community; thus what he has heard, not what
he knows personally, is relevant to his estimation of reputation. See, e.g., Commonwealth
v. Becker, 326 Pa. 105, 191 A. 351 (1937).
24 This type of impeachment is authorized by the statutes cited in note 2 supra. See also
Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469 (1948) (sustaining the practice of impeaching
character witnesses); Commonwealth v. Becker, 326 Pa. 105, 191 A. 351 (1937) (holding
that in murder trial prosecutor may cross-examine defendant's character witnesses con-
cerning their having heard of fact that defendant had previously been accused of murder).
This type of cross-examination is sometimes used even to elicit the arrest record of the
accused. Awkard v. United States, 352 F.2d 641 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
25 The jurisdictions are split concerning the admissibility of prior conviction evidence in
rebuttal. MCCORMICK § 158, at 337. Compare State v. Deboard, 116 Ohio App. 2d 108,
114, 187 N.E.2d 83, 87 (1962) with Ely v. United States, 117 F.2d 526, 529 (6th Cir.
1941).
2 6 See Spector, supra note 3, at 7-8.
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concerning their awareness of the accused's prior record. Even
where the prejudice would be indirect, a defendant may be in-
clined to forego using the testimony of witnesses who might prove
vulnerable to attack because of their own prior crimes.
The fear of prejudice is most severe and the pressure to restrict
testimony the strongest when the accused himself wishes to testi-
fy and yet has a record. By electing not to take the stand the
accused can avoid the possibility of impeachment, for then the
prosecutor would be unable to cross-examine him. Therefore,
even though a defendant's testimony is crucial to his case, fear of
impeachment prejudice may induce him not to testify.27 When a
defendant fails to testify, not only is the jury's view of the evi-
dence restricted, but the jury is likely to interpret his silence as an
admission of guilt.28 Thus a defendant with a record faces a
dilemma: he may testify and risk being convicted because of his
record; or he may remain silent and risk being convicted by his
silence.2 9 These consequences have led one commentator to argue
that the use of impeachment evidence results in both a denial of
due process and of a fair trial.30
III. EXISTING RESPONSES TO THE DANGERS OF
IMPEACHMENT WITH PRIOR CONVICTION EVIDENCE
A. The Traditional Response
The limiting instruction is the traditional protection afforded to
defendants confronted with possible prejudice from prior con-
victions.31 This instruction directs the jury to consider a defen-
dant's previous offences only as they affect the issue of his credi-
bility and not with respect to the issue of his present guilt.32 These
instructions generally call for a distinction jurors cannot or will
not make.33 Indeed, one court has described limiting instructions
as a "ritualistic counsel of psychologically impossible behavior." 34
27 MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 106, Comment on Paragraph (3) (1942). The Kalven
and Zeisel studies, supra note 20, at 1.46, indicate, that, on the average, defendants testify
17 percent more often if they have no prior record. This figure increases to 37 percent
when the case is clear for acquittal.
28 MCCORMICK § 43, at 93; Spector, supra note 3, at 7.
IA New Approach at 925.
30 Note, Constitutional Problems Inherent in the Admissibility of Prior Record Con-
viction Evidence for the Purpose of Impeaching the Credibility of the Defendant Witness,
37 U. CIN. L. REV. 168 (1968).
31 Spector, Impeaching the Defendant by his Prior Convictions and the Proposed
Federal Rules of Evidence: A Half Step Forward and Three Steps Backward, I LOYOLA
U.L.J. (CHICAGO) 247, 251 (1970).32 
Id.
33 Id. at 5 n. 17.
34 United States v. Jacangelo, 281 F.2d 574, 576 (3rd Cir. 1960).
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In answer to these problems, some states have narrowed the
kinds of information the prosecutor may bring to the jury's atten-
tion to impair credibility. One familiar approach is to limit the
class of crimes conviction of which is admissible for impeachment
purposes or to infamous crimes, to felonies, or to felonies or
misdemeanors involving moral turpitude.35 Such limitations, how-
ever, fail to respond to the problem of relevancy. Rather these
limitations seem to be based on the seriousness of the offence.
They reflect a form of continuing, post-institutional punishment
for prior misconduct,36 and exemplify the second class citizenship
to which society relegates its criminals. 37
Another common limitation governs the extent to which the
prosecution may examine witnesses in detail about their prior
convictions. 38 Frequently, a prosecutor may elicit only the name
of the crime, the time and place of the conviction, and the punish-
ment imposed. The effect of these restrictions is questionable,
since the jury's knowledge of conviction alone causes prejudice.
Silence with regard to the details of the prior crime may only
stimulate a jury's imagination. Consequently, some jurisdictions
allow a witness to make a brief statement in explatation or mitiga-
tion of his conduct.39
Other rules further limit the methods by which prior conviction
evidence may be elicited. Illinois, for example, requires such
35 MCCORMICK § 43, at 90-91. Until recently Michigan allowed even evidence of prior
arrests without conviction for impeachment purposes. People v. Hoffman, I Mich. App.
557, 137 N.W.2d 304 (1965). However arrest evidence is now inadmissable, People v.
Brocato, 17 Mich. App. 277, 301-03, 169 N.W.2d 483, 495-96 (1969).
36 At common law these continuing effects of conviction were even harsher, for persons
convicted of a felony were absolutely barred from testifying. This is not surprising, since
almost all felonies were punishable by death. One considered unworthy of life itself could
hardly be considered worthy of belief. I S. GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE § 373 at 5 13- 14 (16th
ed. 1899).
3 7 See McIntosh v. Pittsburgh Ry., 432 Pa. 123, 125, 247 A.2d 467, 468 (1968). In a
trespass suit plaintiff's prior conviction for pandering was admitted to impeach his credi-
bility. By reversing, the court in effect refused to impose second class citizenship on the
plaintiff-appellant:
Certainly it is unfair to handicap him in an attempt to make a damage
recovery which might properly be due him. Appellant has been punished
once for his crime. If that is not sufficient, and should appellant once again
violate the law, the criminal process is quite capable of dealing with his
misconduct.38 People v. Howard, 166 Cal. App. 2d 638, 334 P.2d 105 (1959) (repeated questions
covering prior felony held within permitted limits since witness was uncooperative); State
v. Adams, 257 Wis. 433, 43 N.W.2d 446 (1950) (error for trial court to allow
cross-examination to go beyond the fact of conviction).
39 MCCORMICK § 43, at 92-93; 4 J. WIGMORE,- EVIDENCE § 1117, at 190-91 (1940).
Michigan permits introduction of a statement in mitigation. Wagman v. United States, 269
F. 568 (6th Cir. 1920), cert. denied, 255 U.S. 572 (1920); People v. DeCamp, 146 Mich.
533, 109 N.W. 1047 (1906). However, the court, in its discretion, may allow the prose-
cutor to elicit details of the offense. People v. Childers, 20 Mich. App. 639, 651-52, 174
N.W.2d 565, 571-72 (1969).
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information to be proved by introduction of the witness's criminal
record rather than by his admissions under oath on cross-
examination. 40 Finally, many courts, in the exercise of their dis-
cretion, deny admissibility if the crime is too remote in time.41
This technique rests on the assumption that a conviction is rele-
vant to veracity, but that a witness may have reformed since the
time of his conviction.
B. The Model Code and Uniform Rules Approach
The Model Code of Evidence 42 and the Uniform Rules of
Evidence 43 approach the problem of impeachment evidence in a
manner that offers greater protection to defendants than do the
traditional devices. The most helpful rule, which both codes
adopt, appears to be based in part on the English Criminal Evi-
dence Act, 1898.44 The English Act prevents the use of evidence
of prior convictions for impeachment purposes unless an accused
has introduced evidence of his good character, or his defense
presentation impugned the character of the prosecutor or his
witnesses. Like the English statute, the Model Code and Uniform
Rules propose that evidence of prior convictions used solely for
impeachment purposes is inadmissible, unless the defendant first
introduces evidence solely to support his good character.45 Under
40 For a discussion of Illinois law on this point see Spector, supra note 3, at 10- 14.
41 MCCORMICK § 43, at 93;A New Approach at 928-29.
42 MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 106 (1942):
(1) Subject to Paragraphs (2) and (3), for the purpose of impairing or
supporting the credibility of a witness, any party ... may examine him and
introduce extrinsic evidence . . ., except that extrinsic evidence shall be in-
admissible
(a) of traits of his character other than honesty or veracity or their oppo-
sites, or
(b) of his conviction of crime not involving dishonesty or false statement
(3) If an accused who testifies at the trial introduces no evidence for the
sole purpose of supporting his credibility, no evidence concerning his com-
mission or conviction of crime shall, for the sole purpose of impairing his
credibility, be elicited on his cross-examination or be otherwise introduced
against him; if he introduces evidence for the sole purpose of supporting his
credibility, all evidence admissible under Paragraph (1) shall be admissible
against him.
43 UNIFORM RULE OF EVIDENCE 2 1:
Evidence of the conviction of a witness for a crime not involving dishonesty
or false statement shall be inadmissible for the purpose of impairing his
credibility. If the witness be the accused in a criminal proceeding, no evi-
dence of his conviction of a crime shall be admissible for the sole purpose of
impairing his credibility unless he has first introduced evidence admissible
solely for the purpose of supporting his credibility.
4The Criminal Evidence Act, 1898, 61 & 62 Vict., c. 36, § If.
4 Notes 42-43 supra. The Model Code and Uniform Rules do not provide for an
accused's defense presentation impugning the character of the prosecutor or his witnesses.
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such a rule the defendant can testify to the facts as he knows them
without risking the introduction of his criminal record, or having
to remain silent.46 Obviously, this rule substantially encourages an
accused to testify.
In two respects, however, the rule may not go far enough.
First, the impeachment rule itself provides no protection to an
accused when his witnesses take the stand. Under the impeach-
ment provision, third party witnesses may be discredited with
their own prior records and, if they testify to the accused's good
character, they may be cross-examined concerning their having
heard of the defendant's prior convictions. However, both Model
Code of Evidence rule 30347 and Uniform Rule of Evidence 4548
do respond to this deficiency. These provisions allow a trial judge
to exclude evidence the probative value of which he finds to be
outweighed by the possibility of prejudice. Repeating this general
balancing rule in the impeachment provision would clarify the
availability of this test. It would then be clear to both judges and
counsel that prior conviction evidence must be considered in the
light of possible prejudice to a defendant even if the witness on
the stand is not the accused. 49
In order to avoid a jury's inference of guilt, a defendant is not
only under great pressure to testify to assert his innocence, but he
is also subject to substantial pressure to assert his credibility and
good character.50 However, neither the Model Code nor the Uni-
form Rules will allow him to do this without risking the prejudice
46 MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 106, Comment (1942).4 7 1d. rule 303:
(1) The judge may in his discretion exclude evidence if he finds that its
probative value is outweighed by the risk that its admission will
(a) necessitate undue consumption of time, or
(b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice or of confusing the issues
or of misleading the jury, or
(c) unfairly surprise a party who has not had reasonable ground to antici-
pate that such evidence would be offered.
(2) All Rules stating evidence to be admissible are subject to this Rule
unless the contrary is expressly stated.
48 UNIFORM RULE OF EVIDENCE 45:
Except as in these rules otherwise provided, the judge may in his discretion
exclude evidence if he finds that its probative value is substantially out-
weighed by the risk that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption
of time, or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice or of confusing
the issues or of misleading the jury, or (c) unfairly and harmfully surprise a
party who has not had reasonable opportunity to anticipate that such evi-
dence would be offered.
4 Repeating the general balancing rule in the impeachment provision might suggest that
the rule is applicable only when specifically restated. On the other hand, a comment to the
impeachment provision emphasizing the applicability of the general balancing rule, in this
particular setting, would not restrict its broader impact, and thus would be more appro-
priate.
50 Spector, supra note 31, at 252.
[VOL. 5:3
SPRING 1972]
which the introduction of his criminal record is likely to cause.
Admittedly, to allow an accused the opportunity to assert his
credibility while denying the prosecution the opportunity to rebut
it could be both unfair5 l and misleading, since an accused could
appear righteous when his record, were it disclosed, would in-
dictate the contrary. It can be further argued that by introducing
character evidence, a defendant recognizes the relevancy of the
issue and waives the opportunity to foreclose inquiry into his past
crimes.
Nevertheless, denying the prosecution the opportunity to
cross-examine or rebut credibility by evidence of prior con-
victions may be justifiable. Most jurors reason that the state's
authority will not be brought to bear on an accused nor the time
for trial invested unless the government has a good case. Addi-
tionally, an accused is likely to be disbelieved since jurors gener-
ally recognize the pressure on a defendant, whether guilty or
innocent, to lie in order to enhance his case.5 2 An accusation itself
thus places a defendant's character and innocence in doubt. Since
a defendant in a criminal trial labors under this considerable
handicap, while a prosecutor usually appears upstanding, the
state has a definite initial advantage. Consequently, allowing a
defendant to bring in evidence of his credibility merely grants him
an opportunity to counteract the stigma associated with being a
criminal defendant. Moreover this restriction does not leave the
state defenseless; other more probative means of impeachment
remain available. 53
The response of the Model Code of Evidence to these consid-
erations is manifested in the general balancing test of rule 303P4
Under rule 303 even if the defendant introduces evidence solely
to support his credibility, he may have evidence of his prior
convictions excluded if he can convince the trial judge that the
danger of prejudice outweighs the probative value of the evidence.
The burden of proof as to this issue is placed on the defendant 5
A similar balancing test is provided in Uniform Rule of Evidence
45. However, the test may not be applicable to evidence of a
defendant's prior convictions once he has introduced evidence
solely to support his credibility.5 6 If the general balancing test of
rule 45 does not apply, then the evidence appears admissible
51 MCCORMICK § 43, at 94.
52 See note 17 and accompanying text supra.
53 See text accompanying note 16 supra.
54 See note 47 and accompanying text supra.
55 MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule I I(b)(ii) (1942).
56 This is apparent when Uniform Rule of Evidence 45, supra note 48, is read in
conjunction with Uniform Rule of Evidence 21, supra note 43.
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without further qualification. If rule 45 does apply, the assignment
of the burden of proof is left to the trial court.57
Both the Uniform Rules and the Model Code allow only the
introduction of evidence of convictions involving dishonesty or
false statements for impeachment purposes. 58 This limitation re-
sponds to the relevancy problem involved in using prior con-
viction evidence. By allowing only the use of crimes indicating a
past tendency to lie, the jury is prevented from disbelieving a
witness because of his conviction of crimes displaying manifesta-
tions of bad character other than falsity.
Arguably, even this limitation is unsound for it ignores the
question of whether the witness has a motive to lie. The fact that
a witness has perjured himself in the past indicates no more of his
present motive than prior convictions of other crimes. 59 Never-
theless, the possibility of pressures upon the accused to lie is
obvious, and third party witnesses may also be shown to have
interests or biases which would incline them to lie. When these
factors are considered, the fact that one has previously submitted
to pressure to lie is relevant to the probability of his again suc-
cumbing to such pressure. Prior convictions of crimes other than
perjury, however, do not necessarily indicate the same weak-
ness.60
IV. THE PROPOSED FEDERAL RULES
A. Proposed Rule 609
Rule 609 of the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence 61 takes a
different approach from that of the Model Code and Uniform
Rules. It permits the introduction of evidence of conviction of
crime, not obtained on a plea of nolo contendere, for impeach-
57 UNIFORM RULE OF EVIDENCE 8.
58 Notes 42-43 supra.
59 Spector, supra note 3, at 15.6 0 See note I I and accompanying text supra.
61 Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 609:
(a) For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that he
has been convicted of a crime, except on a plea on nolo contendere, is
admissible but only if the crime (1) was punishable by death or imprisonment
in excess of one year under the law under which he was convicted or (2)
involved dishonesty or false statement regardless of the punishment, unless
(3) in either case, the judge determines that the probative value of the
evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
Section 609(b) provides that convictions over ten years old are inadmissible; 609(c) bars
the use of convictions subject to a pardon, annulment, or other procedure indicating
rehabilitation or innocence; 609(d) disallows the use of juvenile proceedings for impeach-
ment; and 609(e) declares that the pendency of an appeal does not bar the use of a prior
conviction.
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ment purposes if the crime was punishable by death or imprison-
ment for more than a year, or if the crime involves false statement
or dishonesty. The trial judge may, moreover, exclude such evi-
dence if he determines that its probative value is "substantially
outweighed" by the danger of unfair prejudice.6 2 By integrating a
probative value versus unfair prejudice standard into the impeach-
ment provision applicable to both third party witnesses and de-
fendants regardless of their assertions of credibility, the Proposed
Federal Rules may prove more helpful than the Model Code and
Uniform Rules in alleviating the problems of indirect prejudice
from impeachment with prior conviction evidence.63 However, at
the same time proposed rule 609 may offer less protection for
defendants, since it permits the introduction of all felony con-
victions for impeachment purposes, subject only to the trial
judge's balancing of prejudice versus probative value. Allowing
the introduction into evidence of all felonies is a questionable
departure from the Model Code and Uniform Rules approach
which restricts admissibility to crimes involving false statements
or dishonesty.
B. The Luck Doctrine
Proposed rule 609 emerged from dicta in Luck v. United
States,64 which were further clarified in Gordon v. United
States.65 Since the comments to the rule refer specifically to the
Luck and Gordon cases,66 courts are likely to look to those cases
to determine its meaning and application. The Luck case in-
terpreted the District of Columbia statute to vest the trial court
with discretion to rule on the admissibility of evidence of prior
convictions for impeachment purposes. 67 If the judge finds that
"the prejudicial effect of impeachment far outweighs the probative
relevance of the prior conviction to the issue of credibility," prior
conviction evidence should be excluded.6 8
62 Id.
6 See text accompanying notes 47-48 supra. See also Davis v. United States, 409 F.2d
453 (D.C. Cir. 1969), which expands the Luck doctrine to third party witnesses. See text
accompanying notes 64-72 infra, for a discussion of the Luck doctrine.
64 348 F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
- 383 F.2d 936 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
66 PROPOSED FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 609, Advisory Committee's Note (rev. draft
1971).
67 D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-305 (1966). This statute, like the Michigan statute, supra note
2, eliminates the testimonial ban on convicted persons and simulatenously indicates that
such a conviction may be used for impeachment purposes. Judge McGowan focused on
the word "may" and determined its use meant that the trial judge was not required to
admit such testimony, but should exercise his discretion. 348 F.2d at 767-68.
68 Id. at 768.
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In Gordon, Judge, now Mr. Chief Justice, Burger set out sev-
eral factors to guide a trial judge in determining whether the
prejudice of prior convictions "far outweighs" the probative value
of the evidence:
A "rule of thumb" should be that convictions which rest on
dishonest conduct relate to credibility whereas those of vio-
lent or assaultive crimes generally do not; traffic violations,
however serious, are in the same category. The nearness or
remoteness of the prior conviction is also a factor of no small
importance. Even one involving fraud or stealing, for ex-
ample, if it occurred long before and has been followed by a
legally blameless life, should generally be excluded on the
ground of remoteness.
A special and even more difficult problem arises when the
prior conviction is for the same or substantially the same
conduct for which the accused is on trial. Where multiple
convictions of various kinds can be shown, strong reasons
arise for excluding those which are for the same crime be-
cause of the inevitable pressure on lay jurors to believe that
"if he did it before he probably did so this time." As a general
guide, those convictions which are for the same crime should
be admitted sparingly; one solution might well be that dis-
cretion be exercised to limit the impeachment by way of a
similar crime to a single conviction and then only when the
circumstances indicate strong reasons for disclosure, and
where the conviction directly relates to veracity....
One [further] important consideration is what the effect
will be if the defendant does not testify out of fear of being
prejudiced because of impeachment by prior convictions.
Even though a judge might find that the prior convictions are
relevant to credibility and the risk of prejudice to the defend-
ant does not warrant their exclusion, he may nevertheless
conclude that it is more important that the jury have the
benefit of the defendant's version of the case than to have the
defendant remain silent out of fear of impeachment.69
At the. same time, however, if the verdict can be expected to turn
on the credibility of the witnesses, the need for impeachment
becomes more crucial and the trial judge should be more willing to
admit the evidence. 70
Significantly, the Gordon and Luck cases clearly place the
burden of showing sufficient unfair prejudice on the defendant.71
Apparently, inadmissibility becomes the exception rather than the
6 383 F.2d at 940-41 (footnotes omitted).70 1d, at 941.
71 Id. at 939.
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rule since placing the burden of proof on the defendant may rest
on the assumption that prior conviction evidence is generally
more probative than prejudicial.72
C. Deficiencies of Proposed Rule 609
Under proposed rule 609, once a defendant takes the stand,
prior conviction evidence can be used regardless of whether he
puts his credibility in issue. This approach clearly provides less
encouragement for an accused to testify than the Model Code and
Uniform Rules procedures. Under proposed rule 609, in order to
bar prior conviction evidence a defendant must obtain a favorable
ruling from the court on the inadmissibility of his record. A
defendant will want to obtain such a ruling in a pre-trial proceed-
ing so that he can plan his trial strategy accordingly. 73 If success-
ful in obtaining a favorable pre-trial order, a defendant can pre-
vent the prosecution from asking any questions at trial concerning
the accused'srecord. However, in the light of Luck and Gordon,74
proposed rule 609 places on the defendant the burden of proof in
a pre-trial hearing on the exclusion of prior conviction evidence.
These hearings, required whenever counsel seeks to have his
witness's record excluded, will substantially increase the work
load of trial judges. 75 An approach is needed which would require
fewer such hearings, yet protect the interests of the defendant.
Another flaw with the approach of proposed rule 609 is its
heavy reliance on the proper exercise of discretion by trial judges.
This reliance may be misplaced, for judges, in the light of their
past experience of allowing impeachment with prior conviction
evidence as a matter of course, are apt to apply the rule somewhat
restrictively. To many trial judges, prior conviction evidence may
appear relevant as a matter of habit rather than as a result of
analysis. Although judges must weigh the probative value of evi-
dence against the possibility of prejudice whenever they consider
the admissibility of relevant circumstantial evidence, 76 they are
granted wide discretion, and clear abuse must be shown in order
to obtain reversal. 77 Thus, proposed rule 609 may prove
ineffectual in alleviating the problems of the use of prior con-
72 Ordinarily, one assumes that the burden of proof is placed on the party asserting the
improbable.
73 In Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d at 941, Judge Burger discusses the propriety of
pre-trial hearings.
74 Id. at 939.
75 Id. at 941. See also Spector, supra note 3, at 2 1.
78 MCCORMICK § 152, at 319- 20.
77 Luck v. United States, 348 F.2d at 769; Gordon v. United States. 383 F.2d at 939.
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viction evidence for impeachment purposes. 78 Certainly a lack of
uniform results can be expected from the application of the bal-
ancing test by numerous judges. 79
V. AVENUES OF REFORM
A. An Eclectic Approach
A more complete approach to the problems arising from the use
of prior conviction evidence for impeachment purposes can be
achieved by borrowing from the approach of the Model Code and
Uniform Rules as well as proposed Federal Rule 609. The new
rule should provide that only evidence of prior convictions which
involve dishonesty or false statement may be used for impeach-
ment purposes. Furthermore, when a defendant testifies, no prior
conviction evidence should be admissible for the purpose of im-
pairing credibility unless a defendant brings his character into
issue by introducing evidence solely to support his credibility.
Once an accused has asserted his credibility, the question of the
admissibility of his prior criminal record should be decided in a
hearing outside of the jury's presence and before any questions
are asked at trial.80
Before admitting evidence of past crimes, a trial court should
determine at the hearing that the probative value substantially
outweighs the dangers of prejudice. Due regard should be taken of
the Luck doctrine factors,"' the alternative means of impeach-
ment, and the stigma associated with being a criminal defendant.8 2
Contrary to the Luck doctrine,8 3 the Model Code8 4 and the Uni-
form Rules a- when this approach requires a hearing, the burden of
proof should be placed on the prosecution to show that the proba-
tive value of the prior conviction evidence outweighs the dangers
of prejudice to the defendant. The presumption of innocence is
78 In Luck, itself a larceny case, the court clearly indicates that the trial court would not
have been reversed for admitting a recent conviction of the accused for grand larceny. 348
F.2d at 769.
79 Spector, supra note 3, at 21-22.
80 This procedure was recommended by Judge Burger in Gordon, 383 F.2d at 941. Both
Model Code of Evidence rule 11 (a) (when read in connection with rule 303, supra note 48)
and Uniform Rule of Evidence 8 (when read in conjunction with rule 21, supra note 49)
allow such hearings.
81 See text accompanying note 69 supra.
82 There will generally be some alternative means of impeachment but their effectiveness
will vary with the circumstances of each case. So too, the weight to be given the stigma
may vary with the sophistication of the jury. The relevance and possibile prejudicial
impact will vary in each case, as will the need for credibility testimony in general.
83 See text accompanying note 71 supra.
84 See note 55 and accompanying text supra.
85 See note 57 and accompanying text supra.
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central to our criminal justice system and it is therefore appro-
priate that the prosecution bear the burden of proof. Moreover,
the prosecution is in the better position to show the inadequacy of
other means of impeachment and the importance of the issue of
credibility to his case.8 6 This hearing should occur irrespective of
whether the prosecution seeks to impeach by proving an ac-
cused's prior criminal record on cross-examination of a defendant
himself, by cross-examination of a third party witness vouching
for a defendant's credibility, or by direct testimony in rebuttal of
an accused's assertions of credibility. A similar approach again
should be used when the prosecutor wishes to impeach a third
party witness by the use of that witness's past crimes.
This eclectic approach has the advantage of: (1) eliminating the
introduction into evidence of the conviction of any crime not
involving dishonesty or false statement; (2) barring the use of
prior conviction evidence to impeach a defendant unless he in-
troduces evidence solely to support his credibility; and (3) empha-
sizing the balancing of probative value against prejudice in all
remaining circumstances where impeachment with prior con-
viction evidence might be attempted. Although the burden of
proof is placed on the prosecution in admissibility hearings, the
state is nevertheless given the opportunity to protect its interest in
rebutting the alleged credibility of the defendant. Furthermore, by
severely restricting the class of crimes admissible for impeach-
ment purposes, fewer hearings will be required under this ap-
proach than under the Proposed Federal Rules. By barring the
introduction of prior convictions to impeach until the defendant
asserts his credibility, the defendant has sole control over the
introduction of his prior record. If he chooses to rebut the stigma
of being an accused by asserting his credibility, he enables the
prosecution to urge the admission of his prior record. However,
he may testify without incurring this risk by choosing not to assert
his credibility. Even if he does assert his credibility, he may still
prevail during the pretrial hearing at which the admissibility of his
past crimes will be determined.
B. Procedural Power of Courts
One explanation frequently advanced for the lack of reform of
impeachment procedures is that courts are bound by statute to
86 See Comment, Evidence-Illinois Adopts Rule 609 of the Proposed Federal Rules of
Evidence on Impeachment of a Defendant- Witness by his Prior Crimes, 2 LOYOLA
U.L.J. (CI-IlCAGO) 362 (1971), where the author details how close the Illinois Supreme
Court is to taking such a position.
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admit evidence of prior convictions.87 However, rules of evidence
are generally recognized to be procedural,8 8 and the rules regu-
lating procedure are generally considered to be judicial matters.8 9
Therefore, courts may be able to reform their own rules without
waiting for legislative action.
The power of courts to govern their own procedure is variously
established by constitution,9" enabling legislation,91 or inferred as
a matter of inherent judicial power. 92 Although the judiciary thus
has the power to promulgate rules of evidence, the problem re-
mains as to the effect of such a promulgation when there is a
specific statute regulating the matter.9 3 Where a court's power in
this area is granted by constitution or is deemed inherent in the
judiciary, a court should not feel constrained by any such stat-
ute.9 4 However, where a court's power over procedure is granted
by enabling legislation that is not merely declarative of the com-
mon law, a court may have difficulty in justifying an impeachment
rule contrary to one enacted by the legislature. 95 This difficulty
would arise if enabling legislation is interpreted to be a delegation
to the courts of what is primarily legislative power. Under such an
interpretation the legislative enactment of a specific procedural
rule might be deemed to preempt and prevent any judicial action
to the contrary.9 6
An example of the judiciary creating a rule of evidence con-
trary to one established by statute is seen in Michigan. In Perrin
v. Pueler,97 the state supreme court held that evidence of prior
traffic convictions could be used in a negligent entrustment suit
despite a statute expressly barring the use of such evidence in
civil actions 8 The opinion set forth a proposed court rule, later
adopted, allowing full cross-examination for credibility, the sta-
87 Spector, supra note 3, at 23.
88 Morgan, Rules of Evidence-Substantive or Procedural?, 10 VAND. L. REV. 467,
468, 483 (1957).
89 Joiner & Miller, Rules of Practice and Procedure: Study of Judicial Rule Making, 55
MICH. L. REV. 623, 650-51 (1955).
90 Id. at 625.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 624.
93 See note 2 and accompanying text supra.94 Gertner, The Inherent Power of the Courts to Make Rules, 10 U. CIN. L. REV. 32,
47-48 (1936).
95 Id. at 47.
96 Id. Some enabling statutes provide that courts have rulemaking authority in the
absence of contrary legislation. The absence of this limitation in enabling legislation could
be interpreted to give power to the courts to overrule legislative enactments.
97373 Mich. 531, 130 N.W.2d 4 (1964).9 8Id. at 543, 130 N.W.2d at 11.
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tute barring the use of traffic convictions to the contrary notwith-
standing.99
In a jurisdiction where the judiciary's power over procedure is
granted by enabling legislation, courts might still circumvent a
statutory rule of evidence. One means of doing so is exemplified
by the Luck case. The District of Columbia statute' 00 declares
that evidence of prior convictions may be used to impeach a
witness's credibility. The court focused on the permissive lan-
guage of the statute, interpreting it to vest the trial court with
discretion to resolve questions of the admissibility of such evi-
dence.' 0 ' The court thereby enabled exclusion of prior conviction
evidence while ostensibly acting within the confines of the statu-
tory rule. Even if a statutory rule is phrased in imperative lan-
guage,' 02 a court could conceivably interpret it as establishing not
an absolute rule of admissibility, but merely a rule of relevancy.
The statute would be viewed as establishing only that a prior
conviction is, to some degree, probative of credibility. Under this
interpretation, a judge would be able to exclude the evidence if he
found that its probative value was outweighed by the dangers of
prejudice and distraction from the essential issues. Thus, whether
a statutory rule of evidence is permissive or imperative, a court
may be free to fashion its own standards for the admissibility of
prior conviction evidence.
VI. CONCLUSION
The dangers inherent in the use of prior conviction evidence
necessitate reform of the law in states generally allowing such
evidence for impeachment purposes. While the Model Code and
Uniform Rules present alternatives which would improve the
present status of the law, both contain inadequacies. In any event,
neither has been widely adopted.' 03 Although enactment of the
Proposed Federal Rules may have a unifying effect on state
99 id. at 543 n.6, 130 N.W.2d at I I n.6. The rule was formally adopted that same year.
MICH. CT. R. 607 (1965).
100 D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-305 (1966).
101 Luck v. United States, 348 F.2d at 767-68.
102 E.g., the Arkansas statute provides: "No-person shall be disqualified to testify.., by
reason of having been convicted of any felony or other crime whatsoever, but evidence of
his former conviction of any crime ... shall be admissible for the purpose of going to his
credibility or the weight to be given to his testimony." ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-605 (1962)
(emphasis added).
103 Spector, supra note 3, at 16. Some states have adopted law based on Uniform Rule
21: GA. CODE ANN. § 38-415 (Supp. 1971); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-421 (1964); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 19, § 711 (1964); V.I. CODE tit. 5, § 835 (1967).
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law, 10 4 their approach to the problems of impeachment with prior
conviction evidence is also inadequate. The eclectic approach
proposed in this article corrects these inadequacies and affords a
defendant a greater opportunity for an unprejudiced verdict. It
therefore presents a preferable means of alleviating the dangers of
current impeachment practices.
-Lawrence A. Margolis
104 This was the case with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See C. WRIGHT, LAW
OF FEDERAL COURTS § 62, at 260 (1970).
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